

Possible future strategies to limit the extent and impact of major system disturbances

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- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Risk-based Security Assessment
- ▶ Methods for Risk-based Security Assessment
- ▶ Umbrella Project
- ▶ Summary

- ▶ Definition of Power System Security:

*Security of a power system refers to the degree of **RISK** in its ability to survive imminent disturbances (contingencies) without interruption of customer service. [Kundur et al.]*

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 - Increased uncertainty due to intraday trading and infeed from renewable energy sources
 - High, fluctuating cross-border flows

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- ▶ N-1 criterion reaching its limits due to
 - increased uncertainty due to intraday trading and infeed from renewable energy sources
 - high, fluctuating cross-border flows

➔ How to extend/supplement the N-1 criterion with security assessment that can account for these uncertainties?

Develop strategies to keep system
secure while facilitating market
operation and integration of
renewable energy



Proposed method:
Risk-based security assessment

$$\text{Risk} = \text{probability} \cdot \text{severity}$$




Figure 1: Risk zones in operation based on different risk levels. [UCTE OH]

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► Advantages

- Quantitative formulation of risk
- Explicit formulation of acceptable risk level
- Direct trade-off between security and cost
- Incorporation of different sources of uncertainty

► Challenges

- Modeling (e.g. definition of outage probability and severity)
- Computational requirements
- Visualization (for interpretation in control center applications)





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Steps and Outcomes



Methods for Risk-based Security Assessment



I. Monte Carlo Approach

[D.S. Kirschen, D. Jayaweera, 2007]

II. Multiobjective Optimization

[F. Xiao, J. McCalley, 2009]

III. N-1 security with probabilistic guarantees

[M. Vrakopoulou et al., 2012]

Methods for Risk-based Security Assessment



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
- Increased understanding of risk in different operating conditions

II. Multiobjective Optimization

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III. N-1 security with probabilistic guarantees

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Methods for Risk-based Security Assessment



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
II. Multiobjective Optimization

[F. Xiao, J. McCalley, 2009]

- Lower risk level at lower cost
- Optimize risk level, but allow for deterministic violations

III. N-1 security with probabilistic guarantees

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DV: Deterministic violation
NV: Near violation

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
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
- Guarantees that operation is N-1 secure with probability of at least $1 - \epsilon$
- Reduce hours of insecure operation by accounting for uncertainty



- ▶ Risk-based security assessment
 - Supplements N-1 criterion
 - Accounts for both probability and impact of contingencies
 - Allows for quantitative assessment of system security
 - Additional information can be used to mitigate risk and optimize power transits
 - Different state-of-the-art technological means (FACTS, phase-shifting transformers, thermal line ratings, reactive power support etc.) can be used to enhance system security.

- ▶ Challenges include
 - Modeling of uncertainties and severity of contingencies
 - Formulation of a large-scale, tractable problem

UMBRELLA View



UMBRELLA Summary



- ▶ New situation in transmission grid operation
 - Growing utilization and rising uncertainty
 - Additional operational degrees of freedom (FACTS, PST, ...)

- ▶ UMBRELLA toolbox
 - Forecasts including uncertainty
 - Enhanced optimization algorithms
 - Risk-based security assessment

UMBRELLA Summary



- ▶ New situation in transmission grid operation
 - Growing utilization and rising uncertainty
 - Additional operational degrees of freedom (HVDC, PST, ...)

- ▶ UMBRELLA toolbox
 - Forecasts including uncertainty
 - Enhanced optimization algorithms
 - Risk-based security assessment

- ➔ Early identification of critical system states

- ➔ Maximize power transits and limit impact of disturbances

Thank you for your attention!



Sources:

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